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1 .  INTRODUCTION 
intend to consider here the prospects for the GATT-focused multilateral 
trading system, the perils it faces and the promise it nonetheless holds. The 
threats faced at present by the GA’IT arise from a variety of factors, including 
changes in the world economy. These changes have produced fissiparous 
tendencies gnawing at many of the basic principles embodied in the GATT. 
Recalling the preamble to the GATT, and mindful of its central articles, the 
following may justifiably be cited as the main principles of the GATT 
A ‘fix-rule’ trading regime is to be preferred to a ‘fix-quantity’ one. In other 
words, ‘managed trade’ (or ‘results-oriented’ trade), which seeks 
quantitative targets of outcomes in trade instead of settling on rules and 
lettingchips fall where they may, is to be rejected. 
Multilateralism, where these trade rules extend without discrimination to all 
members of the trading regime, is generally to be preferred to discriminatory 
arrangements. 
Markets are to be opened through conventional reduction in trade barriers, 
and new disciplines are to be established, by resort to mutuality and balance 
of concessions, ruling out aggressive, unilaterally-determined demands for 
unrequited concessions that could come from the strong against the weak.’ 
And in the same spirit of the rule of law, the adjudication of dispute must be 
impartial, pitting the strong against the weak in equal contest, both the balance 
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’ In turn, this would tend to undercut multilateralism as the strong move to get preferential 
concessions for themselves and the weak grant them at the expense of the trade with the not-so- 
strong. 
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of negotiations and the impartiality of dispute settlement reflecting the correct and 
growing perception that the GATT system provides the best defence of the weak. 
I consider here the serious challenges to these GATT principles of 
multilateralism that have recently arisen from several directions and taken the 
form of an advocacy of managed trade, aggressive unilateralism and regionalism. 
Underlying these phenomena, though deriving strength also from other factors, is 
a common thread: the increasing sensitivity to ‘unfair trade’ and the sense that 
the methods of the GATT-based multilateral trading system cannot cope with the 
issues that alleged unfair trade by one’s rivals forces on our attention.’ 
2 .  THE GATT ARCHITECTURE: THE THREAT 
a. The Rise of Unfair- Trade 
At the outset, it should be noted that there is a strong case for free trade to be 
complemented by fair trade. One can argue that a free trade wgime (such as the 
GATT), overseeing trade among trading nations, must embody the principle of 
largely symmetric free trade by each; otherwise, the efficient allocation of 
activity among trading nations that the regime must reflect will be compromised 
by the licence taken by those who stray. 
There is also the prudential argument that, even if one were not interested in 
cosmopolitanism and were actuated only by considerations of narrow national 
interest, one’s own ability to sustain free trade would be imperilled in practice if 
one’s rivals were considered to be trading unfairly. Pluralism politics will 
generally rule out accommodation to free trade unless trade is also seen to be fair. 
Hence, the liberalisation of trade has always been accompanied by the institution 
or activation of the two now-conventional measures against unfair trade: 
countervailing duty (CVD) against foreign subsidisation of exports and the anti- 
dumping (AD) duty to counteract the presumably predatory effects of dumping. 
The problem is that ‘unfair trade’ is a two-face creature; one face is friendly to 
free trade; the other frowns on it. Measures against unfair trade can be misused 
to allege unfair trade unfairly and thus to undermine free trade. And new 
definitions of widening scope, of what constitutes unfair, ‘unreasonable’ and 
unacceptable trade can be invented in unending improvisations. It is this other. 
ugly face that we currently see and must fear. Why? There are several reasons. 
1. Perhaps the most compelling reason for the increase in allegations of unfair 
trade is simply the outbreak of protectionist pressures in the early 1980s. 
combined with the fact that protection is easier to procure if the successful 
foreign rival is alleged to be unfairly trading than if one pleads for it merely by 
citing the difficulty to one’s situation. 
I have dealt with these concerns and their consequences at much greater length. comparing them 
also with earlier market-failure-related threats to the world trading system, in Bhagwati ( 1991a). 
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2. Again, the implausibility with which such allegations can be made by 
protectionists is diminished by the increased focus on non-tariff barriers (NTBs) 
relative to now-negligible tariffs. The latter are transparent and indeed, 
uncomplicated. Gertrude Stein could have said, ‘A tariff is a tariff is a tariff.’ But 
NTBs are hard to handle. Suspicions often linger of their invisible hand 
strangulating trade. 
3. In addition, there are changes in the world economy that reinforce the rise 
of unfair-trade concerns to centre stage. Three merit attention. Perhaps the most 
important factor, responsible in particular for the American conversion to 
neurosis on this front, has been the relative decline of the United States in the 
world economy, leading to what was referred to in Bhagwati and Irwin (1987) as 
the Diminished Giant Syndrome. 
The Diminished Giant Syndrome of the United States now parallels Britain’s 
at the end of the 19th century when the United States and Germany arrived on 
the world scene. But the trade panic and the attendant petulance about the rivals 
have an extra edge in the United States today. The psychological need to be 
‘number one’ is evidently more compelling in a country where there is ceaseless 
ranking of institutions, corporations, the sartorially elegant and the wealthiest. 
And then again, the country whose rise promotes the challenge, Japan, is one 
that is peculiarly susceptible to charges of unfair trade. Indeed, such allegations 
against Japan have been so common for at least half a century that today’s 
Japan-bashers, in reviving old and fearful stereotypes about Japan, should be 
called regressionists’ rather than the ‘revisionists’ they fancy themselves to be. 
4. The change in the world economy that propels more forcefully the unfair 
trade crusade is the increased criss-crossing of foreign investments which is 
turning the globalised world into a veritable spider’s web. This has increasingly 
meant that everyone now tends to be in everyone elses backyard, making import 
competition in one’s own market, and export competition in the other’s market 
and in third markets, ever more fierce. In this atmosphere, suspicions of unfair 
advantage accruing to one’s rivals arise readily, fester and then poison the 
political process that makes trade policy. 
5. Yet another aspect of the world economy, the arrival of flexible exchange 
rates, has added to the problem. Volatility in the exchange rate can wipe you out 
and your own recourse may be to cry ‘foul’. The rival who gains from the 
changed rate is not going to complain, leaving the floor to those who lose. 
Dramatic shifts in exchange rates, like the yen-dollar rate before and after the 
1985 Plaza Accord, underline the intensity of the problem that can arise. Unless 
some degree of stability in the structure of exchange rates is achieved by 
coordination of underlying macro-economic policies, the rise of unfair-trade 
allegations will be hard to contain. 
6. But an important role in making unfair trade concerns potent in politics has 
been played also by developments in the realm of ideas. In the theoretical modes 
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that have recently been analysed, with oligopolistic competition among 
competing firms from different nations formally modelled, one can demonstrate 
that the most improbable and negligible-looking form of unfair advantage 
provided by foreign governments can lead to predatory and large effects on one’s 
industry’s competitiveness and survival. The loss of a few high-tech industries to 
Japan, the visibility of some Japanese governmental support and the assumed 
presence of invisible support in a myriad of other ways, and the added certitude 
that those industries have substantial if immeasurable external economies, have 
combined to make the American scene a potentially fertile ground for such 
analytical demonstrations to flourish in a symbiotically interacting relationship 
between the theorists and the interest groups, correspondingly intensifying the 
obsession with unfair trade. 
These converging forces have resulted in: 
A capture, and protectionist misuse, of the traditional unfair-trade 
mechanisms in regard to important competition, CVD and AD, in both the 
European Community and the United States, as documented splendidly by 
Finger and Associates (1992), Hindley (1988), and Messerlin (1989). 
An extension of the unfair-trade concerns to markets for exports, in others’ 
home markets and in third markets. 
An expansion of such concerns to wholly new areas (such as differences in 
retail distribution systems, saving rates and workers’ rights) in regard to fair 
competition in both imports and exports. The last two developments are more 
novel and merit further comment. 
The notion of unfair trade in one’s export markets has led not merely to 
conventional concerns about subsidies to one’s rivals there but to two new 
twists. First, the question of intra-sectoraf reciprocity of trade barriers has 
become fairly widespread by now, whereas earlier only some ‘average’ equality 
(across all imports) of mutual openness of the two countries would have sufficed 
to meet the criterion. Second, the question of fairness is now considered 
important enough to justify actions which can only be described as reopening the 
terms of earlier trade negotiations in view of ex post realities. This is certainly 
one of the many arguments for seeking unrequited trade concessions from Japan: 
that the difficulty of penetrating her markets was underestimated and hence the 
trade concessions given to her were more than those received, and that the 
situation must be corrected by new concessions by Japan. 
These notions are dangerous enough and have driven some of the recent 
GATT-illegal aggressive unilateralism that will be discussed ~hort ly .~ But they 
are benign compared with the extension of unfair-trade notions to wholly new 
In principle, ‘fair trade’ concerns need not lead to aggressive unilateralism. Governments may 
still stick to multilateral, consensual procedures to pursue their fair trade concerns. Alas, they have 
increasingly tended not to: such is the power of the notion that others are ‘unfair’ or venal by one’s 
unilaterally-defined standards. 
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areas, as in the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act in the United 
States and in the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) with Japan. In both 
instances, the notion of unreasonable unfair-trade practices has been extended to 
areas that range over matters as diverse as domestic anti-monopoly policies, 
retail distribution systems, infrastructure spending, savings rates, workers’ rights 
and so on. The American shopping list in the initial SII talks was reported to 
have included 240 items. 
The problem with trying to include such things, and indeed most policies and 
institutions, as the natural target for objections that they affect trade and must 
therefore be scrutinised and changed to suit one’s advantage if free trade is to be 
allowed, is simply that one is opening up a Pandora’s  BOX.^ Thus, if Bangladesh 
has current comparative advantage in textiles, due to lower wages, we no longer 
need to worry about being scolded as protectionists when we reject imports of 
Bangladeshi textiles as unfair trade caused by her ‘pauper labour’. After all, the 
low Bangladeshi wages are a result of inadequate population-control policies 
and of inefficient economic policies that inhibit investment and growth and 
hence a rise in real wages. 
In going down this unwise trade route, we put the world trading system 
at risk. If everything becomes a question of fair trade, the likely outcome will be 
to remove the possibility of agreeing to a rule-oriented trading system. 
‘Managed trade’ will then be the outcome, the bureaucrats allocating the trade 
according to what domestic lobbying pressures and foreign political muscle 
dictate. 
b. Issue of Managed Trade 
Indeed, the question of managed trade has arisen as a threat to the GATT 
regime, not just because of the outbreak of unfair-trade-mindedness. It has also 
derived from three other notions: (i) Most trade is managed trade anyway. (ii) 
Japan, a major player today, is exotic and different; she will not, and cannot, play 
by rules. And (iii) high-tech industries are so important that they cannot be, or 
will not be, left to the market place. Each contention is erroneous. 
Managed Trade Anyway? That trade occurs frequently by either bypassing or 
flouting GATT discipline, as with VERs on goods, or outside of its framework, 
as in agriculture and services, is indeed true. But it is a non-sequitur to conclude 
that rules do not work and more managed trade must therefore be the way to go. 
Yet, the glass is half empty and half full. But there is little doubt that it would 
have been emptier still if the GA’IT had not provided the overall framework and 
The policy and theoretical implications of these demands for ‘level playing fields’ everywhere 
are explored further in Bhagwati (1991a). 
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ethos that kept the glass upright instead of falling on its side. Moreover, the issue 
surely is whether we want to empty the glass further or to fill it up. The Uruguay 
Round negotiations are properly about filling it further. 
Japan-is-diflerent Argument. The ‘Japan question’ raises different issues, but, 
for recent critics, leads to a similar conclusion: that managed trade with Japan is 
either inevitable or desirable. In particular, culturalists have had a field day with 
their assertion that Japan’s cultural uniqueness makes fix-rule trade with her 
impossible to contemplate and that Japan would in fact prefer managed trade. 
What is perceived as the ‘Japan (trade) problem’ has been with us a long time. It 
has reflected Japan’s rapid growth, her import dependence for raw materials and 
her consequent rapid growth of exports that has been hard to accommodate in 
the often more sluggish world economy. The giant among Lilliputians has in 
consequence been repeatedly tied down by quantity restraints on her trade. If the 
Japanese appear responsive to negotiating on quantities, can it not be that they 
have learned from their trade history that this is the only way left open to them 
by their trading partners? 
Again, the argument is often made that the Japanese behave differently in 
competition. They are ‘predatory’ and hence need to be restrained; our rules are 
meaningless for such predators. This contention is amusing, and the notion that 
American and other companies, by contrast, are ‘benign’ competitors is quite 
silly. Surely the ‘animal spirits’ of capitalist entrepreneurs are manifest in the 
United States and Western Europe as much as in Japan; the jugular is certainly 
the preferred target of all, although the Japanese may be better at times in getting 
there. The successful always appear predatory. 
High-tech Support? The Japan question. however, feeds an altogether 
different, more universal, argument for managed trade in the United States. This 
relates to fear that unless trade restrictions and targets are imposed in high-tech 
industries, these industries will be lost to countries such as Japan which 
somehow managed to spawn and support them against the firms in countries that 
abstain from such support. 
Now, while economists have great difficulty in finding externalities in specific 
industries and are generally inclined to discount claims of their existence in a 
sufficiently disproportionate degree so as to justify selected support, the opposite 
is true of politicians. Today, thanks to the scientific revolution that started in 
informatics and biogenetics, there is virtually no politician in any major 
developed country who does not feel that high-tech industries must be attracted 
and supported for their manifest externalities and, in non-economic terms, for 
their identification with modernisation in view of their state-of-the-arts and at- 
the-frontier status. 
Given these perceptions, which then becomes realities that economists must 
work with, i t  is evident that a rules-oriented free trade system in high-tech 
industries will not be workable unless 
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either there is a multilateral mechanism for bringing up front the various 
differing ways in which different governments are alleged to be biasing the 
outcomes in their favour, so that the ‘net balance’ of such artificial 
advantages among the different rivals is sorted out and then eliminated; 
or one goes yet further and manages essentially to get an acceptable degree 
of harmonisation (that then irons out the differences) by adherence to a code 
of do’s and don’ts. 
The latter may not be possible if governments have definite and differing 
preferences for certain policies. The former surely is possible and would enable 
the Japanese to point to such artificial US advantages that may stem from higher 
defence expenditures and support for science through the National Science 
Foundation when the Americans complain about the Japanese Government’s 
guidance and support to pooled research, etc. The multilateral format would 
ensure that the finger-pointing would be fair and balanced, where appropriate, 
without the advantage of the thicker finger in bilateral one-on-one confrontations. 
This solution where the trade issue would be managed by institutional 
innovation so as to maintain the fix-rule regime in high-tech industries was 
proposed in Bhagwati (1988). The idea of a code for high-tech has since been 
taken up also by Ostry (1 990) in a study of trade and innovation policies in the 
triad constituted by the United States, the European Community and Japan. It is 
important to emphasise, however, that these proposals are for ‘trade 
management’, not for ‘managed trade’. A fix-rule regime is consistent with the 
former: in fact, the Tokyo Round codes, negotiations on trade-barrier reductions, 
the establishment of new disciplines, the enforcement of one’s trade rights and 
assurance of fulfilment of one’s trade obligations are all part of ‘trade 
management’ that would support and sustain the fix-rule regime. ‘Managed 
trade’, on the other hand, is the antithesis of the fix-rule regime. This is 
emphasised simply because, with the free entry of amateurs into this politically- 
rewarding field, the two wholly opposed concepts are increasingly confused and 
used interchangeably. 
c.  Aggressive Unilateralism 
The concerns over unfair trade have created yet another hazard for the 
fix-rule GATT system in the recent use of aggressive unilateralism by the 
United States to impose on others its unilaterally-defined views of unfair trade 
practices. 
I refer here, of course, to the use of the Section 301 and super 301 provisions 
of American trade legislation, as updated in the 1988 Act, to demand 
negotiations from specific countries on ‘priority’ practices that the United States 
find unacceptable, regardless of whether they are proscribed by the GATT or 
another treaty, and to seek their abolition on a tight time schedule set by the 
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United States, using tariff retaliation by the United States if necessary. What is 
the problem with this p ~ l i c y ? ~  
Question of GATT-illegality. At the outset, it must be understood that the 
GATT has the force of a treaty for the United States. Now, when the United 
States retaliates, as it has already in some Section 301 actions imposing tariffs 
against particular goods of a targeted country, the GATT-illegality is at several 
levels. The discriminatory nature of such tariffs violates Article I which imposes 
the MFN obligation. Also, since the tariff is in practice likely to be bound at a 
lower level than the retaliatory tariff, this will generally be in violation of Article 
I1 as well. 
Why Does GATT-illegality Matter? Prima facie, honouring a treaty 
commitment is to reaffirm one’s respect for orderly procedures and the rule of 
law in dealing with other nation states. But does vigilantism have a place when 
the sheriff is asleep in the saloon? Or, to rise to a higher principle, is there not a 
case for ‘justified disobedience’, as Hudec (1990) has put it, when the law is not 
working as it should? In either case, a doctrine of ‘creative illegality’ is being 
invoked: a breach of law to improve the law is being claimed. 
The problem with this line of defence by the United States of GATT-illegality 
(to improve an ineffective GATT) is that almost no one else in the trading 
system quite accepts this justification. Indeed, as Hudec has noted, the United 
States’ own record of acting within the rules to respect others’ GATT-defined 
rights has not been exemplary. 
There is also the problem that means may affect ends. It is not likely that a 
declared willingness to break GATT commitments, and actual breach thereof, 
may spread cynicism towards such commitments by others rather than adherence 
to them in the future? I would even suggest that it undermines the credibility of 
the commitments accepted by nations that take the law thus into their own 
hands. Thus, in the recent Uruguay Round negotiations, there has been 
substantial progress on the possible dismantling of the MFA in textiles. The 
United States has made commitments in its offer, which however, mostly come 
at the end of the 10-year period which is agreed upon. Some of the key 
developing countries, having seen the recent tendency in the US Congress to 
have its way regardless of GATT obligations and to use American economic 
muscle to pursue unilaterally-defined agendas, are frankly sceptical whether, 
when the time comes, the United States will simply dishonour its commitments 
and say: sorry, we cannot deliver. 
One aspect of Section 301 actions and intentions is also the extraction from others of unrequited 
concessions, in contrast to the mutual concessions that characterise the GATT negotiations. It is 
also possible to argue that 301 may be used for ‘altruistic’ reasons such as moving everyone 
towards a better trading regime, as in the Uruguay Round negotiations, and is not necessarily a 
tool for improving only US welfare. These alternative ‘rationales’ and objectives behind 301 are 
explored in depth in the present author’s contribution to Bhagwati and Patrick (1990). 
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Trade Diversion. Let us now turn to other dangers inherent in this form of 
unilateral extraction of trade concessions from others. In particular, since it 
reflects clout and concentrated pressure, there is a strong likelihood that the 
targets of Section 301 actions will satisfy American demands by diverting trade 
from other countries (with small political clout) to the United States, satisfying 
the strong at the expense of the weak. Admittedly, USTR Ambassador Carla 
Hills repeatedly stresses that USTR will ensure that markets are opened under 
Section 301 in a non-discriminatory fashion. But ex ante intentions can diverge 
from ex post outcomes. The countries targeted for action know that the 
American pressures are more likely to ease if the United States gets a good share 
than if it does not. 
Atmospherics. There is also the possibility that the use of muscle to impose 
one’s own views and to extract one-way trade concessions will poison the ethos 
of fairness in trade relations without which open markets are hard to sustain. 
A Benign Dictator? Even if one makes the implausible assumption that 
Section 301 is used only for ‘altruistic’ reasons (such as using muscle to make 
progress in the Uruguay Round negotiations), the notion that the United States 
should serve as a benign dictator, laying down its own definition of a desirable 
trading regime instead of making (admittedly slower) progress by persuasion 
and mutual concession, is hard to accept. Institutions cannot be built on notions 
of benign dictatorship: this is a lesson that the functioning of democracy in the 
United States itself, with all the slowness and ‘inefficiencies’ that practitioners 
of realpolitik complain about, amply teaches us all. 
We must also confront the fact that trade policy is rarely made in pluralistic 
democracies by dictators with monolithic objective functions. Instead, it reflects 
the resolution of sectional interests in the political domain. There is no necessary 
correspondence, therefore, between the triumphant sectoral interests and the 
national interest and, most important, the international or cosmopolitan interest 
that must define the world trading regime. 
The instrument of aggressive unilateralism therefore has important drawbacks 
and somehow the supporters of a rules-based multilateral trading system will 
have to find a way of cutting it down to size through an agreement proscribing 
the use of such instruments. In retrospect, however, one can compliment 
Ambassador Hills on having navigated, with minimal damage to date, in the 
stormy waters that the US Congress has created with its ill-considered 
legislation. 
d .  Regionalism 
The obsession with unfair trade, the flirtation with managed trade and 
aggressive unilateralism: these threats to the fix-rule, multilateral GATT system 
are real and, in my view, few knowledgeable scholars will disagree on the issues 
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they raise. But an altogether different, and debatable, type of threat to the GATT 
system is posed by the recent growth of regionalism a la Article XXIV of the 
GATT.6 The nature of the threat must be clearly understood therefore, and ways 
of containing it must be found. 
1. Free trade areas (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs) are GATT-compatible 
thanks to Article XXIV. The reasoning underlying the inclusion of Article XXIV 
in the GATT must have reflected three rather different rationales. First, full 
integration on trade, i.e., going all the way down to freedom of trade flows 
among any sub-set of GATT members, would have to be allowed since it created 
an important element of single-nation characteristics among these nations, and 
implied that the resulting quasi-national status following from such integration 
in trade legitimated the exception to MFN obligation towards other GATT 
members. Second, the very fact that the exception would be permitted only for 
the extremely difficult case where all trade barriers would need to come down, 
precluded the possibility that all kinds of preferential arrangements would break 
out, returning the world to the fragmented, discriminatory bilateralism of the 
1930s. Third, one could think of Article XXIV also as permitting a 
supplemental, practical route to the universal free trade that the GATT might be 
said to favour implicitly as the ultimate goal, the general negotiations during the 
many rounds leading to a dismantling of trade barriers on a GATT-wide basis, 
while deeper integration would be achieved simultaneously within those areas 
where the politics permitted faster movement to free trade under a strategy of 
full and time-bound pre-commitment. 
2. It is fair, therefore, to say that regional integration was not thought of, either 
at the GATT’s creation or subsequently, as necessarily antithetical to the GATT. 
The United States, however, was certainly not an enthusiastic convert to Article 
XXIV, having perceived itself as a victim of Imperial Preference and thus having 
long been suspicious of discriminatory trade arrangements. But, while i t  
restrained itself from resorting to Article XXIV, the formation of the European 
Common Market in 1958 marked a partial watershed. The United States put its 
shoulder to the wheel and saw the Common Market through, negotiating around 
the different hoops of Article XXIV, emasculating the Article somewhat so as to 
seek GATT approval of an imperfect union, all in the cause of what it saw as a 
politically beneficial union of the original Six that formed the Common Market. 
3. This in fact accounts for why, despite the enthusiasm in the 1970s of Harry 
Johnson and others for a North Atlantic Free Trade Area, and even a Pacific Free 
Trade Area, nothing came of it; the United States remained indifferent to such 
notions. 
Article XXIV permits discrimination against GATT members, denying them MFN rights, if a 
sub-set of members forms a free trade area or a customs union. 
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If the US-centered proposals for FTAs were largely patterned on the Common 
Market’s less-demanding neighbour, the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA), there was an outbreak of such proposals in the developing countries as 
well. While stimulated by the European examples, they were motivated by an 
altogether different economic rationale. This was that, given any targeted level 
of import-substituting industrialisation, the developing countries, with their 
small markets, could reduce the cost of this industrialisation by exploiting 
economies of scale through preferential opening of markets with one another.’ 
By the end of the 1960s, however, the attempts at forming regional FTAs and 
CUs along these lines had also collapsed. The problem was that, rather than use 
trade liberalisation and hence prices to guide industry allocation, the developing 
countries attempting such unions sought to allocate industries by command and 
then tie trade to such allocations, putting the cart before the horse and killing the 
forward motion.* 
Thus, while the world was indeed filled, in the 1960s, with all variety of 
proposals for regional blocs, regionalism had virtually died by the end of the 
decade - except for the original Common Market and EFTA. 
4. The revival of the Article XXIV variety of regionalism today, in this 
historical perspective, raises the questions: will regionalism today die as the 
earlier, equally dramatic one did; and why is regionalism feared today as a threat 
to the GATT? That the current rise of regionalism is likely to endure and gain in 
strength seems probable: history is unlikely therefore to repeat itself. There are 
several reasons for this. 
First, the conversion of the United States, hitherto an abstaining party, to 
Article XXIV with its FTAs with Israel and, more importantly, with Canada 
represents a change of considerable importance. The United States is widely 
perceived as a major player, and its changed attitude on Article XXIV is a major 
event that shifts the balance of forces towards regionalism, as compared with the 
situation in the 1960s. 
Second, Europe 1992 and the impending integration of Eastern Europe into 
the European Community have reinforced - in the way the formation of the 
Common Market in 1959 did with many then - those in North America who 
feel that a countervailing bloc must be formed there as well. 
Third, there are strong non-economic, political and cultural factors also 
driving Mexico towards a FTA with her northern neighbour. The Hispanic 
destiny that many in America fear from illegal immigration and integration with 
Mexico has its flip side in the American destiny that Mexico’s reforming elite, 
trained in the top United States universities, hopes for. 
’ This rationale was developed by many writers, including Cooper and Massell (1965). Johnson 
(1965), and the present author - Bhagwati (1968) - at the time. 
A splendid analysis of this failure is provided by Dell (1966). 
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Fourth, the offer by President Bush to get more nations from South America 
to join the United States in a FTA, is reflective of the compulsions that the debt 
crisis imposes on American policy to respond in a regional framework to ensure 
that this crisis remains manageable and does not engulf the United States whose 
banks are principally endangered by it. 
Finally, the conjunction of the two dramatic events, Europe 1992 and the 
United States-Canada FTA and impending North American FTA, even though 
fortuitous and prompted by different motivations and historical circumstances, 
has created a sense elsewhere that regionalism is the order of the day and that 
others must follow suit. 
5. But if regionalism is likely to endure this time, the perception that it will 
undermine the GATT is also different from the perception in the 1960s that it 
was generally compatible with, rather than antithetical to, the GATT. 
This fearful perception arises from two different sources. There is the 
fear that the preoccupation with Europe 1992, with the extension of the 
United States-Canada FTA to include Mexico, and their possible further 
expansions, will take the attention of the major players, the United States and the 
European Community, away from the Uruguay Round and its critical task of 
remaking the GATT. But there is little evidence that the feared neglect of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations has occurred enough to put the whole endeavour at 
risk. 
There is more substance however, to the fear that the repeated American 
'strategic' argument that regionalism (and agreements among like-minded 
nations) would be America's new weapon if the GATT were not amended and 
bent to American demands for reconstitution and reform, combined with actual 
resort to regional arrangements, will produce the negative perception that 
regionalism is antithetical to the GATT and that, if Article XXIV-sanctioned 
FTAs proliferate, this is somehow the nemesis of the GATT. This false antithesis 
certainly prompted Thurow 's earlier mentioned error of judgment in calling our 
attention to a live corpse. 
Nonetheless, since the impression has spread that the regional FTAs and CUs 
are fragmenting the world economy, instead of progressively unifying it along 
with the multilateral initiatives, and that the GATT is therefore being sidelined, it 
is necessary that the older, and wider, perspective be restored by confidence- 
building measures and by revisions in Article XXIV and other GA'M' Articles. 
Among them might be the following: 
A forceful statement from the major players (through G-5, G-7, and other 
institutions) that regionalism and the GATT are not incompatible; and that 
the GATT remains the central institution overseeing issues of world trade 
policy, despite regional blocs. 
Insistence at the GATT on a strict interpretation of Article XXIV in regard to 
all newly-emerging and prospective FTAs so that less demanding 
THREATS TO THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 455 
preferential and discriminatory arrangements do not multiply in the present 
pro-regionalism climate. 
As for the revisions to GATT Articles, the following are important: 
Article XXIV needs to be re-examined to ensure its true consonance with 
GA?T’s general objectives. This requires that the immediate trade diversion 
be minimised and that the trade blocs continue to coalesce towards 
worldwide free trade instead of fragmenting the world economy. 
1. I have suggested (Bhagwati, 1991a) that one way to reduce trade diversion 
would be to rule out ITAs and to admit only CUs (which have a common 
external tariff). Since the United States is the principal source and partner of new 
preferential arrangements, and since it is basically a low-tariff country, this 
would imply that any proposed CU with, say Brazil, would mean that Brazil’s 
external tariffs would have to be brought down to US levels. A more compelling 
rule, on the other hand, would simply be to insist also that, on any commodity, 
the lowest of the tariffs existing in any member of the CU prior to the CU, would 
have to be adopted as part of the CU’s common external tariff. 
2. Also, since we would want the CU’s to move onto further expansion 
towards worldwide free trade, a formal inclusion in Article XXIV of the 
obligation on the part of any existing CUs to be open to new membership from 
GATT contracting parties would also be a step in the right direction. 
Whereas the suggestion above about CUs being preferable to FTAs to 
prevent trade diversion relates essentially to preferential tariffs as the cause 
of potential trade diversion, it is necessary to recognise that today the trade 
protection comes instead in the form of mainly VERs (voluntary export 
restraints), AD (anti-dumping) actions and CVD (countervailing duty) 
measures. These instruments are selective and they are elastic: they can 
result in varying levels of protection. 
The analysis of trade diversion in preferential trading arrangements then 
cannot proceed without recognising that, given these selective measures which 
can be targeted at nonmembers, trade-creating situations can be transformed 
endogenously into trade diversion. Thus, imagine a trade-creating impulse in a 
US-Mexico ITA. Assume that the United States crowds Mexico in an industry 
where Mexico is the least efficient and Taiwan the most efficient supplier. If 
trade bamers were conventional and given, there would be trade creation. But 
now Mexicans have the option of protecting their industry and accepting US 
exports at the expense of Taiwan exports by starting up AD actions against 
Taiwan. Again, if Mexico crowds a US industry, then the United States (being 
more powerful) can even impose VERs on Taiwan. In GATT cases, trade 
creation would have been replaced by trade diversion via the use of elastic and 
selectively targeted trade barriers against efficient nonmembers of the FTA. I 
would guess that a sizeable fraction of the AD actions by the EC against the Far 
East, documented fully by Hindley (1988) and Messerlin (1989), are a response 
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to intensification of internal competition following the Common Market and 
hence fits into my model. 
If so, evidently we need to rein in these selective instruments if we are going 
to go the regional route; else trade diversion will break out. This means that we 
need greater discipline on the use of these instruments at the GATT. Article VI 
on anti-dumping must be tightened to exclude the capture by protectionists that 
is notoriously evident today. Equally, VERs should be proscribed and the 
discipline of Article XIX on safeguards protection, which mandates 
nondiscriminatory protection, must be enforced. In short, if we go the regional 
route, the GATT must be strengthened in these ways, not weakened! Those who 
think of regionalism and the GATT as alternatives have therefore not thought the 
matter through at a deeper level. 
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